“Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own set of facts.”
― Daniel Patrick Moynihan
“Reality is what you can get away with.” –Jonathan Rauch
The two juxtaposed quotes here illustrate the transition in our culture from one era of truth-affirmation or truth-denial, to another era of truth-indifference. Senator Moynihan, tart of tongue and brilliant in forming aphorisms, spoke of a grounding in factuality as the basis for a common epistemic citizenship. Opinions by themselves, no matter how well-expressed or gaudily clad, should not carry the day. “Entitlement” in truth-affirmation grows out of adhering, to the degree possible, to a shared reality based on facts and evidence. Brookings Institution scholar and public intellectual Rauch, author of The Constitution of Knowledge, has identified the current trans valuation of the value of truth-affirmation, in noting the conning, the clickbait attention-seeking, the trolling, at work in our culture, among leading political figures. Rauch, in fact, described Donald Trump’s “troll epistemology” in a National Affairs Journal article written in 2018, during Trump’s first term.
In the decades from Senator Moynihan’s famous quip to Rauch’s recent careful articulation of the “constitution of knowledge,” our culture has trended toward an increasing celebration of confabulated new realities—many of them described in the “bespoke realities” of Renee DiResta’s recent book Invisible Rulers, which while not definitive in explaining the impact of social media and its impact, does offer one cogent explanation of how the “influencer class” uses various social media platforms for engagement and spreading of propaganda to appeal to pre-existing beliefs of various tribes of citizens. Unfortunately, “what you can get away with” has indeed become the new reality for many. Boundaries and norms have given way against a relentless tide of truth-ignoring in the midst of much tribalistic cacophony.
Earlier anti-empirical tendencies in the Intellectual Dark Web, described in Part One of this essay, are now rampant within the current floodtide of falsehoods, rumors, propaganda, memes, and belief-formation among audiences seeking confirmation for ingroup or tribalistic beliefs. The currently fractured information ecosystem means that “heterodoxy” can include, potentially, any social media “influencer”, or “content creator;” can present a new “truth”, an alternative set of facts pulled out of airy nothing, or present as definitive any distorted or misleading content. The current media ecosystem spawns new “heterodox” voices constantly, especially on podcast platforms, YouTube channels, and Tiktok.
This is the world with Joe Rogan as apex “influencer,” constantly in his friendly “just asking questions” mode, and encouraging alternative perspectives against anything that might be mainstream or expert-driven. The “influencer culture,” in itself, manifests what journalist Matt Pearce calls the “destruction of patience as the biggest cultural shift” in our lifetimes, one that foreshadows moving away from “actual sources of information” that might inform deliberation, and moves toward “a kind of folk-story society ripe for manipulation by demagogues who promise simplicity in an increasingly complex world.” This trend toward the “folk story” supplants more empirical, factual inquiry, and in turn amplifies attention-seeking and performative actions which I propose as signature traits of “dark heterodoxy.”
While there are reasons for declining trust in experts and institutions, as well articulated by Greg Lukianoff and Angel Eduardo, and an urgent need to rebuild trust, it is not only experts and elites who must participate in that endeavor. It is a collective urgency that means more “better heterodoxy,” and less “dark heterodoxy.”
This darkening world of “heterodoxy” has its own attitudes, its own affective domain, its own “vibes”, and its own incentive structures. Most of them are founded on a deliberate contrarianism, questioning of any established institution, or expert voice, or group of those considered “elitist.” Political scientist Brian Klaas describes a kind of “knowingness” where people claim to know facts, evidence, and theories that they actually don’t—which is very much part of the darker world of “heterodoxy.” Related to this attitude is the anti-empirical “influencer” mentality: there is prestige-seeking, and a willingness to cherry-pick evidence and construct new conspiracy theories; to ignore or demonize those who disagree; to calibrate carefully in the interest of self-advancement and “clicks and views”; to play to an audience and create new distorted realities with them, in order to consolidate professional or social position.
Some of these traits, interestingly, echo those that Musa al-Gharbi has described as those of “symbolic capitalists”: those who we now often refer to simply as “the woke” or progressive members of elite institutions. The “dark heterodox” also deal with words, symbols, imagery, and “narratives”, and interact with others like themselves in their own media ecosystem, use their own signals and their own language. The “dark heterodox” in the influencer realm also eagerly participate in what Dan Williams calls a “marketplace of rationalizations”, supplying those wanting their beliefs confirmed with attractive “reasons” for their beliefs, rather than challenging their readers or viewers with new or better evidence. For those trending toward “dark heterodoxy,” it becomes a marketplace for supplying and even co-creating new “bespoke realities” with their fanbases—a form of “fanservice.”
In their own way, they have become anti-elite elitists, faux-populists, or champions of a postliberal worldview such as that of Curtis Yarvin, a mega-influencer for the new populist-authoritarianism, with the President as monarch. Yarvin may be a signature figure of the new “Dark Enlightenment” of which he has spoken and written—a new era of aspirational anti-democratic, anti-liberal forces turning the empiricism of the Enlightenment on its head. Yarvin’s thinking has gained much attention among the new populist right and has unleashed energies that trend toward a “dark heterodoxy” of an extreme form, against the “Cathedral,” Yarvin’s term for the traditional establishment.
Unlike the truth-aspiring “heterodox”, the new “dark” heterodox move away from professional standards and testing of evidence in the pursuit of attention, fame, and cultural entrepreneurship. They may wear the mantle of classic liberalism, or traditional conservatism, or some form of revanchist populism, or no political affiliation at all, but the true acid test for most of the new “heterodox” influencers in this sphere is an unwillingness to follow Tetlock’s mental discipline of “integrative complexity.” Instead they batten, too often, on a formula of simplistic, audience-driven bromides, under-evidenced ideas, idee fixes, pre-tested rhetorical tropes, and performative gestures.
We are left with a “heterodox” sphere that tests the Overton Window enormously in maintaining any contact with empiricism. If reality-testing is a hallmark of the “better heterodox”, as described in Part One of this essay, the devolving “dark heterodox” trends more towards confabulations where they are the heroes and heroines, freed from the constraints of human frailty and responsibilities toward fellow citizens for facts, evidence, and rational persuasion. Narcissism, self-promotion, and conspiracy theorizing are also linked together, in the view of some researchers, and may be among the traits of some of the “dark heterodox” described here
After all, an ever-expanding “heterodox sphere” that contains podcaster Candace Owens and “media personality” Russell Brand, on one hand, and dissident scholars Nicholas Christakis, Lee Jussim, and Kathleen Stock, on the other, is a deeply unserious way to think about an expanded “heterodox” realm. To think that all five of the individuals just named are equally evidence-based, equally attuned to reality-testing, and equally meritorious in the pursuit of truth, is patently absurd. A more serious way to imagine an aspirational better heterodoxy involves describing habits of mind and character. These include intellectual virtues of active open-mindedness, curiosity, humility, and carefulness. A critical collective attitude of intellectual humility also involves a willingness to engage with others in honest debate and a search for better evidence, in a spirit of truth-seeking pluralism, rather than scoring points on social media or online bulletin boards, or entertaining only an audience that wants its pre-existing beliefs confirmed.
In contrast with the best features of “heterodox” thinking, I point to several cases of the new darkening heterodoxy where Tetlock’s reality-testing methodology do not appear as a regular habit. They are arranged from what I consider the most aligned with epistemic norms and reality-testing, into the further precincts of “dark heterodoxy” and detachment from reality. These examples are similar to “use cases” in my ongoing attempt to understand “heterodoxy” in a better way, and are not meant to be definitive or fixed, but to describe tendencies and trajectories.
Peripatetics and Confabulators
Another loose network of “heterodox” figures now receives much attention in social media, at conferences, at major public ceremonies, and sometimes even hosted by the apex “influencer,” Joe Rogan himself. They do not constitute a newer version of the Intellectual Dark Web, but some individuals were part of it, and have carried forward some of the dissenting attitudes which have evolved into new forms of contrarian, heavily ideological, or conspiracy-driven thinking.
Peter Boghossian of the famous “Grievance Studies” hoax often articulates classic liberal beliefs, but has somehow found, at times, a congenial environment for scholarship and activism in Victor Orban’s Hungary, a decidedly illiberal regime, as noted by many scholars and political leaders in liberal democracies. He also intemperately claims that universities in western democracies should be “burned down” rather than reformed. This stance is decidedly at odds with that of the Heterodox Academy itself.
Another, and likely more famous, peripatetic figure in the new “heterodoxy” sphere is Douglas Murray, the well-known conservative journalist and public intellectual in the U.K. Murray’s prominence is based on several well-known books: The Madness of Crowds, The Strange Death of Europe, and most recently, The War on the West. Murray’s overarching theme is the threat to western civilization and the cultures of European countries, based on excesses of immigration, and the internal decline of learning and respect for the heritage of his own native Britain and its achievements. As significant as these claims are, Murray’s habits of sweeping denunciations and ignoring evidence that does not comport with his themes are noted by some journalists and writers in his own country.
Another one of the primary inheritors of the IDW’s confabulating tendencies is the renegade academic Bret Weinstein—another example of good-faith, well-evidenced “heterodoxy” gone awry. Weinstein has constructed a veritable industry of conspiracy theories spun out from his previous career in academia, but with layer upon layer of concocted conspiracy theories about COVID vaccines (and vaccines in general), the Democratic Party, the “deep state”, the liberal press, and invasions of Chinese mercenaries through illegal immigration across the southern Border, but starting in the Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama. In keeping with “dark heterodoxy”, Weinstein sees shadowy, nefarious “elites” everywhere controlling ordinary citizens’ lives, that somehow he has the special insider knowledge to interpret the manipulations of the “elites” for a gullible public.
The pathway into “dark heterodoxy” among these public figures is marked by variable or oscillating tendencies toward truth-seeking and turns away from it, into confabulating, conspiracizing, binary thinking, or extreme statements and positions.
The Heterodox Publications
In the current moment, one of the most rapidly growing new media platforms is The Free Press, founded by Bari Weiss, whose career at The New York Times, and her dissenting exit from it, are well known. Weiss has built an enthusiastic and growing readership who are looking for an alternative to the constantly demonized “mainstream press.” More voices and new media outlets are a welcome development, and The Free Press has often brought dissenting or independent voices before the reading public in a way that the mainstream or establishment press has not. In particular, guest columnists like John McWhorter and Ruy Teixiera are adding to the luster of The Free Press as a champion of freewheeling and independent thinking, with alternative perspectives, and departures from consensus reporting and opinion writing in mainstream outlets.
However, the masthead on The Free Press proclaims a mission that its regular reporting and commentary often do not live up to. That masthead says: “A Free Press for Free People,” dedicated to the bedrock values of “honesty, doggedness, and fierce independence.” Any persistent reader with an open mind studying The Free Press since its inception notices a pattern of performative inveighing against “mainstream narratives”, against the “establishment,” against liberal Democrats (who most definitely have their own challenges), and for what can only be called a form of MAGA-adjacency.
There is a studied lack of interest in, or curiosity about, the many forms of illiberal behavior displayed by the current President and some of his most devoted followers. These include the demonization of political opponents as enemies, the intolerance for differences of opinion in public discourse, the reality distortions about the Big Lie of the “stolen” 2020 election, and the intense polarization resulting from these behaviors that echo the worst tendencies of the woke Left. Some glimmers of better reporting now appear in The Free Press in the wake of the President’s many executive orders and diktats in recent weeks, but have not changed the overall political complexion of the publication.
The Free Press could be more accurately described as a center-right journal trending toward populist themes—and traditional careful journalistic practices may dissolve in the interest of this particular worldview. “Fierce independence” in reporting and truth-telling is not, at the current time, an accurate way of describing this ostensibly “heterodox” publication. The Free Press is a good example of what journalist Cathy Young calls “one-sided heterodoxy,” and that involves a mental jujitsu that does not honor its readership.
Interesting contrasts with The Free Press are found in two other publications with large and growing readerships: Compact Magazine, noted for its “horse shoe” worldview encompassing writers across the spectrum from populist right to center left to progressive. In this way, Compact Magazine is “heterodox” with viewpoint diversity, and a strong perspectival element is part of its mission without the Free Press’s attempts to be “independent” while aligning with a center-right or populist point of view.
Another contrast in “heterodox” journalism is Quillette, which chooses to cover challenging stories and controversies through the lens of classic liberalism and a social scientific approach, rather than the dodgy shape-shifting of The Free Press. The editor of Quillette, Claire Lehmann, articulates well a sound precept for “heterodox” journalism—a willingness to offend readers to pursue truth and avoid “audience capture”:
“If you’re in the business of journalism, and you care about the truth, you will actually have to fight with your audience from time to time. If you don’t—you’re not actually in the business of journalism—you’re a confirmation bias service provider.”
The Heterodox Free Speech Champion
Ironies abound in the emerging world of “dark heterodoxy”, ironies that create their own reality distortion zones. Michael Shellenberger is one of the free speech champions who participated in the well-known Twitter Files controversy, which has led to a darker path into “heterodoxy.”
The ongoing conspiracism spun up out of the Twitter Files1—one of the most controversial conspiracy theories in public discourse in recent years—has persisted because of the ostensible allegiance of the journalists involved to free speech absolutism. Government censorship, content moderation, and the role of major social media companies in either promoting or undermining a complicated set of facts are, of course, all appropriate matters for debate. In a related controversy, the current Supreme Court majority did not find for plaintiffs alleging censorship in Murthy vs. Missouri, concerning purported biased content moderation practices, because of the legal doctrine of standing.
But this complicated discussion of government censorship and content moderation on social media has not dissuaded Shellenberger and others from their favored “narrative” of vast, highly coordinated censorship at work in the United States, and in other countries (which of course have different legal regimes). In fact, Shellenberger is the primary advocate of the confabulated “Censorship Industrial Complex,” a supposed network of bad actors, powerful individuals, agencies, and policies, all acting nefariously and seamlessly together to suppress free speech, in the United States and elsewhere.
This is an excellent example of “concept creep” that those given to conspiracism often practice, in amplifying beyond facts and evidence. It is, for them, a compelling theory that explains—or distorts and simplifies—complicated realities in politics, culture, or discourse. Philosopher Dan Williams has demolished the “Censorship Industrial Complex” in a careful analysis of its very partial truths, cherrypicked evidence, and vastly inflated claims, pointing out how the moral absolutism attached to the under-evidenced claims in this world-spanning “conspiracy” lead to totalizing, unempirical, performative rhetoric. The crowning irony about this claim of vast shadowy censorship at work somehow does not prevent Shellenberger from growing his podcast, from writing for a large audience, and from being a frequent invited speaker on censorship. This is one point of entry into a dark “heterodoxy” that is not open to revision or fallibilism.
However, heterodoxy of this strand can become an all-consuming endeavor. Journalist Jesse Singal has noted contradictions in Shellenberger’s championing of free speech, in his journalistic practices, and in new conspiracy theories involving the Trump administration’s defunding of USAID, where supposedly USAID, the CIA, and the OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project), were all involved in the 2019 attempt to impeach President Trump during Trump’s first term.
The dark side of “heterodoxy” of this type is most clearly described by Ted Nordhaus, Shellenberger’s one-time collaborator at the Breakthrough Institute, in a remarkably prescient piece, “Michael and Me.” In that article, Nordhaus describes Shellenberger’s earlier beliefs in their joint work on “heterodox” environmental projects together, in their shared work in evolving from progressive environmentalism toward a more scientifically-based “ecomodernism” movement favoring nuclear power and other initiatives. But the need for audience and attention, according to Nordhaus, was always a feature of Shellenberger’s style, in advancing himself, and a conspiratorial turn developed early, before a final break came in 2015. Nordhaus describes Shellenberger’s pathway into conspiracism as one of proving to an audience that he shares all of their favorite beliefs, however under-evidenced, while wearing the mantle of “free speech champion.” The former colleague and friend describes a “heterodox” influencer’s mental journey into a world of audience capture, of aligning with the tribe that already has its beliefs in place, and finds compelling a one-note performance against the “establishment”, and the “media.”
Shellenberger also inveighs constantly against experts and “global elites” who think differently from his preferred narratives. All of this is done to be “different” through a repertoire of standard tropes and gestures, almost formulaic, that are found on Shellenberger’s growing Public substack. The opportunism at work, combined with “epistemic closure,” make this form of “heterodoxy” a cautionary tale for the active open-mindedness necessary to renew our society and create a shared reality again.
The Heterodox Oligarch
Inevitably, any discussion of the unfortunate directions of some in the “heterodox sphere” will end with Elon Musk. The world’s richest man, known for his entrepreneurial genius in owning six companies and with aspirations for space travel to Mars, is now fully ensconced, for now, as the leading power figure in the Trump administration, after the President himself. His current role with the DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) initiative, in reconfiguring the U.S. federal government through budget reductions, laying off many thousands of employees, is now covered constantly in the mainstream and alternative media. Notably, Musk touts his platform (X)/Twitter as the “new media” that should replace the traditional media, which he claims is full of falsehoods—especially when it covers him negatively in any way. He champions the idea of “citizen journalism” on (X), but many users of the platform, from different political perspectives, have found it an increasingly toxic space. Many have left for other social media platforms, or use (X) in a more limited way because of Musk’s conspiracism and promotion of self-serving memes and brief posts that champion his very tech-oligarchic worldview.
Brian Klaas, Jesse Singal, Renee DiResta, and Noah Smith have written recent accounts of Musk’s behavior and its potential origins and emerging impacts. But Richard Hanania has published, on his own substack, the most thorough discussion of Musk’s impact on public discourse and public governance in the United States and elsewhere. With over 220 million followers on (X) worldwide, Musk obviously has enormous reach and impact. Hanania considers him a signature figure in an environment where truth and falsehood no long matter; the incentives for the correspondence theory of truth are thrown overboard entirely because other incentives are at work. Those incentives have little to do with open-mindedness, and fair treatment of other perspectives, and manifest a lack of curiosity about the lives of those affected by his power and influence.
Hanania describes how Musk’s (X) platform offers the “community notes” feature, where subscribers can offer context, corrections, and identify distortions and falsehoods—and that it is Musk himself who is most often corrected by others on his own platform. Even more telling is Musk’s promotion of the Grok A.I. search assistant on the platform. That A.I. agent allows subscribers to search tweets at scale across (x) with no content moderation whatever, and to produce “reports” based on LLM (large language model) technology. The irony is that Grok reports show that Musk himself is a super spreader of misinformation on his own platform. As Hanania observes, however, Musk is indifferent to any such reporting, and has no interest in self-correcting, and that the implications for this kind of power are vast:
Musk’s takeover of X and the changes he has made there, along with his personal dominance over the discourse and communication style more generally, are something different. In the past, conservatives and liberals would argue about what books you should read or where you should get your news from. Musk’s rule of X, in contrast, stands in opposition to the idea that anyone should read any news in the first place, or do serious work on public policy issues for that matter. This is a war on the human intellect, distinct from and in many ways more sinister than liberal bias or censorship. Musk does not usually suppress knowledge or facts, but denigrates the entire idea that anyone can live in a universe where knowledge or facts matter, and seeks to reduce the prominence of anyone who would be naïve enough to think they should.
This may be the nadir for “dark heterodoxy” in the hyperpartisan, fractured information landscape we now experience. Indifference to any epistemic norms and active promotion of falsehoods “at scale”, in our times, is a development that Hannah Arendt imagined prophetically when she wrote of the “annihilation of truth.”
Towards Better Heterodox Habits and Traits: Some Guideposts
Precepts for a better heterodoxy for librarians recapitulate several of the key lessons from the “better heterodox” figures discussed in Part One. In addition, the growth of collective intellectual humility—only now being explored in a scholarly way—may help counteract some of the darker strains of “heterodoxy” and amplify habits of mind that promote a better strain of “heterodoxy”: one that is independent, fair-minded, viewpoint-diverse while insisting on truth-tracking, and always in search of better evidence.
These epistemic norms for a better heterodoxy should apply widely in our society, and specifically in professional discussions and debates within our profession:
Follow Tetlock’s “integrative complexity” in considering divergent data and information before converging on proposals and solutions
Cultivate intellectual virtues of curiosity, active open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual humility in workplaces, professional development and professional associations, and enlist others to form group practices based on these virtues
Discipline one’s use of terms like “misinformation,” “disinformation,” “diversity,” “inclusivity,” “critical thinking,” and “censorship,” and use them in more carefully considered, well-reasoned ways
Overcome self-censorship and preference falsification in the workplace and in professional associations
Be willing to speak against one’s “own side” when it is offering under-evidenced proposals or solutions
Promote the merits of ideas of colleagues regardless of their identity essentialism (race/ethnicity, gender/sexual orientation, socioeconomic status)
Insist on fallibilism and experimentation rather than received “truths”
Promote the suite of intellectual tools involving statistical significance, base rates, and probabilistic reasoning, balanced against professional judgment in interpreting data from large natural experiments beyond controlled or laboratory conditions
Develop greater capacities for self-correction in professional learning and discourse
Form truth-seeking coalitions with those in other professions, community groups, or civic associations
Seek to improve institutions and associations rather than undermine them
Be willing to be “unclassifiable” and unpredictable in the face of evidence as a true hallmark of heterodox librarianship
Conclusion
This survey of the "heterodox" landscape (Parts One and Two) is by no means definitive. Instead, it's a provisional snapshot of some evolving features of this landscape and an attempt to describe the mental habits and character traits that make better heterodoxy possible, while offering cautions against tendencies that turn toward illiberalism. Too much contemporary heterodoxy satisfies ambitions, stokes conflicts, and engages in performative gestures rather than building a shared reality across lines of difference.
Rebuilding trust in our libraries, our universities and cultural institutions, our civic institutions and governments, and among our fellow citizens, means growing a “better heterodoxy,” and learning collectively to create a shared reality again.
Appendix: Recommended Readings to Promote Heterodox Thinking
DiResta, Renee. Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality. Amazon.com: Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality (Audible Audio Edition): Renee DiResta, Anna Caputo, PublicAffairs: Books
Guzman, Monica. I Never Thought of It That Way: How to Have Fearlessly Curious Conversations in Dangerously Divided Times. I Never Thought of It That Way: How to Have Fearlessly Curious Conversations in Dangerously Divided Times: Guzmán, Mónica: 9781637740323: Amazon.com: Books
Jacobs, Alan. How to Think: A Survival Guide for a World at Odds. How to Think: A Survival Guide for a World at Odds: Jacobs, Alan: 9780451499608: Amazon.com: Books
Jensen, Robert. It’s Debatable: Talking Authentically about Tricky Topics. It’s Debatable – Interlink Publishing
Kucharski, Adam. Proof: The Art and Science of Certainty. Proof: The Art and Science of Certainty: Kucharski, Adam: 9781541606692: Amazon.com: Books
Perlmutter, Saul, John Campbell, and Robert MacCoun. Third Millennium Thinking: Creating Sense in a World of Nonsense. Third Millennium Thinking: Creating Sense in a World of Nonsense: Perlmutter PhD, Saul, Campbell PhD, John, MacCoun PhD, Robert: 9780316438100: Amazon.com: Books
Stanovich, Keith. The Bias that Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking. The Bias That Divides Us The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking | Books Gateway | MIT Press
Tetlock, Philip, and Dan Gardner. Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction: Tetlock, Philip E., Gardner, Dan: 9780804136716: Amazon.com: Books
Uscinski, Joe, and Adam Enders. Conspiracy Theories: a Primer. Conspiracy Theories: A Primer - University of Miami
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On the Twitter Files controversy:
Twitter Files - Wikipedia; Matt Taibbi’s account: (42) THE TWITTER FILES - by Matt Taibbi - The Twitter Files; New Yorker: What the Twitter Files Reveal About Free Speech and Social Media | The New Yorker; TechDirt account: Hello! You’ve Been Referred Here Because You’re Wrong About Twitter And Hunter Biden’s Laptop | Techdirt; The Twitter Files Playbook Comes For The US Government | Techdirt AllSides: Twitter Files | AllSides
Thank you Craig for a fascinating and important series of articles. It is very important that "heterodoxy" be defined by epistemic conduct and doxastic attitudes, rather than in terms of positions on particular issues, or fealty to specific cultural tribe. Your summary of what those principles comprise are excellent, and I'll be referring readers to them in the future. I've been following the intellectuals you name here--Boghossian, Murray, and Weinstein--for a number of years now, and while I still appreciate much of what the first two are still doing I have come to view them with a degree of circumspection, while I've stopped following Weinstein altogether because I've found his arguments have gone rather off the rails.
Interesting article. Thank you.
A couple of asides: "Cathedral" used in the sense above was used much earlier - first, I think, by Eric Raymond in 1997: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cathedral_and_the_Bazaar .
When I read the Moynahan quote, my first thought was that he is wrong - and in a very fundamental way. Everyone's "facts" are always and have always been what they privately think they are. I think modern neuroscience strongly agrees with me. Nobody has any ability to directly observe the world we live in - all we have access to is highly processed interpretations of it through neural processing operations whose mechanisms nobody has the faintest clue about yet. To say they aren't "entitled" to them is essentially to say they don't have the right to think what they want to think privately. And that implies some kind of thought policing. Certainly it implies censorship.
It seems to me that what this always boils down to is who gets to decide what ideas and information is allowed to be propagated to where other people can see it. And, of course, librarians have a deep interest in how this argument plays out.
And - on the Free Press - your depiction of them made me laugh. I was one of the founding members but dropped my subscription after the platform took what my perception told me was a persistent move leftward in its handling of virtually every political event - with the exception of anything having to do with Israel, which is sacrosanct and off limits for Bari Weiss. Most telling was their handling of the comments section. At first, they only censored highly abusive comments. But then after awhile they began acting like what the conspiracy theorists accused Facebook and Twitter of at their worst. People began dropping their subscriptions in droves and many have gone to other substacks where they trade stories about what they were put on timeout or banned for. There was a troll, who started out with the pen-name "Comprof" who seemed to have some kind of vendetta against Bari, mercilessly and very abusively derided virtually everything in the FP and it's "troglodyte" readership. He would periodically remind everyone what a hypocrite Bari is, for while she was a student at Columbia, she personally spearheaded an activist movement attempting to have a middle-eastern studies professor fired, whose sole crime seems to have been that he was decidedly "anti-Zionist" in his classes. Comprof eventually did get banned. He payed for another subscription, resurrecting himself as "Comprof 2.0" (gotta give this guy credit for a sense of humor). He claimed consistently to be a black communist college professor at a midwestern University.
Anyway, my point in that narration is that you have depicted the FP as "Center-Right". I and virtually everyone I ever read in the comments except Comprof had the opposite opinion - that she was creating a "Center-left" publication, decidedly at odds with her readership at the time. She had this one big chance to get into the market as a result of her highly publicized exit from the NYT and capitalized on it like she had Hearst blood in her veins - I'll give her that. But she really, really wanted to be working for a leftwing publication like the NYT, except for that Israel thing.
I also subscribe to Quillette. I like Quillette by and large - the long form essays generally have a lot more meat to them than most outlets produce (I also subscribe to Unherd). But in some ways it suffers from a similar bias that the FP does. If you look at their articles over the last year, say, you'll be hard pressed to come up with more than one or two that could make what one would honestly call a conservative case for anything. The were big on deconstructing the Canadian myth of Indian children burials and all that. But on pretty much everything else, I could just as well be reading an MSM publication, only better written. Unherd is all over the map. It's Kathleen Stock's home right now. And they regularly feature some interesting articles by conservitive-ish writers. But it's 10-1 the other way. I think the problem is that people who have been trained to write have come through programs utterly dominated 100% by far-left thinking people. They end up just not knowing how left of center they think the center is.
I don't consider myself a hardcore conservative by any means. More of a libertarian. The way I look at labels like these is that one probably ought to define them statistically. Look for where the median voter stands. That's the center. There is some probability distribution spread around that center - doesn't have to be uniform (gaussian). But the tails go way out both ways. Most writers in all these publications discussed in your essay and by me here are somewhere left of that median.