Philosophical Foundations for a Pluralist Librarianship

(Image: RANT 73 [flickr]; public domain)

In a recent Heterodoxy in the Stacks post, Craig Gibson set out a number of Practices of Pluralism, (many of which he gleaned from attending a conference) and how they might be applied to libraries. Previously, I had proposed a “manifesto” in support of Library Neutrality and Pluralism, arguing that the many competing social interests represented within contemporary diverse, multicultural societies are best served by libraries espousing and practicing multidimensional neutrality regarding values, stakeholders, processes and goals (both individual and collective). The underlying imperative of this manifesto was pluralism, or the recognition (and valuing) of difference, but in the context of universalism: in other words, the freedom for individuals to live according to their own values and beliefs as well as the traditions of their respective cultures, but within a shared polity, such that each are committed to acknowledging (and defending) this freedom for others owing to their shared citizenship, and agreeing to live under a single set of laws. In such a system—also described by John Rawls as political liberalism—a base of commonly-shared values is agreed upon, enabling everyone the right to the individual and collective pursuit of their own comprehensive doctrines (e.g., religions, belief systems), while not imposing such beliefs on others or abridging others’ inalienable rights to their own doctrines.  

Principle #10 in support of this contention was a philosophical commitment to realism as a more ethical stance than would be institutionalized idealism or utopianism—i.e., comprehensive doctrines by which society should be organized. This is because the imposition of an idealist doctrine on the part of either a minority or a majority would exceed the norms of Rawlsian political liberalism because it would inevitably conflict with many different belief systems, i.e., other comprehensive doctrines. (I did, however, stress that there is nothing wrong with individuals developing and holding idealistic conceptions, only that these should not be adopted institutionally).   

Upon reflection, I realize that realism is just one element of what would need to be a larger suite of philosophy for pluralist librarianship. I would now like to sketch out the additional dimensions of this philosophical stance. It shall consider: 

• ontology (what exists); 

• epistemology (how we know what we think we know about what exists); 

• belief ethics (the extent to which our knowledge claims are based on evidence and a reliable process); 

• intellectual virtues; 

• communicative rationality;  

• a theory of truth; and 

• a political philosophy. 

My goal is that, together, these elements can comprise a robust ethical framework for pluralistic librarianship, one that can stimulate further dialogue and discussion.  I propose that the public interest in pluralistic societies would be best served if libraries adhere to the following principles: 

1.   Philosophical Realism 

Pluralistic librarianship recognizes the metaphysical existence of an intersubjectively-experienced, mind-independent world—a world which would exist without minds to perceive it, and which remains unchanged by our thoughts, beliefs or feelings about it. As an institution dedicated to knowledge organization and generation, the library should be seen as existing within and as a part of the world about which such knowledge is created. I concur with LIS scholar Birger Hjorland that realism is a vitally important stance in librarianship, such that we are enabled to distinguish between reality and beliefs about that reality, and thus be capable of evaluating the evidence in support of those beliefs.  

This contrasts, in my view, with the incommensurability and insufficiency of postmodern relativism to the project of pluralistic libraries. As I will explain further below, one of the most important components of Rawls’ political liberalism is overlapping consensus: the possibility of many different comprehensive doctrines (e.g., Judaism, Catholicism, Islam) agreeing (each for their own internal, different reasons) on the laws by which the society they share shall be governed. With postmodern relativism, however, there can be no single truth: each of us has our own truths; there is no intersubjectively-experienced (i.e. shared), mind-independent world, nor is it possible to know it. Instead, reality may be shaped by the individual will and accord with each individual’s beliefs. Such an epistemological position is (I would argue) not just incompatible with conventional library functions (such as establishing ontologies and descriptions for purposes of cataloguing), but makes impossible the project of a universal polity, for no society may be successfully shared in which none of can agree on the very terms of reality and existence itself; there can be no overlapping consensus regarding countless individually-defined realities.  

Therefore, I suggest that realism is the starting point for facilitating an overlapping consensus between diverse social groups. But it is not sufficient: We also need to acknowledge that our ability to come to know and understand this mind-independent reality is imperfect. 

2.   Post-Positivism: 

While the postmodern relativist would say that true knowledge of the world is impossible and that we must each make our own truth, and positivists assert that complete knowledge of the world is possible with the proper methods, post-positivists counter that the mind-independent world—and truth about it—does exist but that our knowledge of it must always be incomplete, imperfect (owing to our biases and preconceptions) and contingent on the acquisition of new or revised information. In short, we are all fallible knowers. 

3.   Ethical Belief  

Given our innate fallibility as knowers, we all have a duty to inquire, to test our beliefs and to ensure that they are not mere assertions but are appropriately supported by sufficient evidence. Such appropriately-supported beliefs are judged to be both ethical and praiseworthy; those that are mere baseless assertions—especially as regards the supposed moral and intellectual vices and failings of others—are not.  

4.   Virtue Epistemology: 

We are not just fallible knowers but situated ones as well: that is, we are constrained in our ability to fully know this mind-independent world by virtue of our geographic and temporal circumstances (where we live and when, limiting our ability to know the past), as well as specific life circumstances and experiences (the advantages and disadvantages accorded to us by virtue of our abilities, environments and life events). As such, these circumstances demand of us that we develop and practice the epistemic virtues of humility, curiosity, open-mindedness and a willingness to amend, correct or abandon our knowledge claims; as opposed to the vices of presumed infallibility, certainty, dogmatic conviction, closed-mindedness, and an instrumental fixation on being proved correct. We must not only avoid epistemic vice, but exercise caution in accusing others of committing it.  

5.   Communicative Rationality 

The intersubjectivity of the preceding value is important, because we don’t just create knowledge on our own, but with the involvement of others through dialogue and collective sense-making, as Jurgen Habermas argued. As social beings, we are hardwired to create new knowledge together through the exchange and discussion of ideas, a function for which libraries were inherently designed, and this is a vitally important part of determining the pragmatic truthfulness of our claims.  

6.   Pragmatism Regarding Truth 

We generally think of truth metaphysically, as something that exists “out there” and for which we must search. As such, the correspondence theory of truth considers the extent to which our claims comport with conditions that actually obtain in the world, and the coherence theory with how our claims hold together and are internally consistent. The pragmatic theory of truth, however, isn’t so much concerned with proving the actual existence of a given thing, but rather that our claims about that thing be appropriately constructed so as to withstand scrutiny. In other words, pragmatism has a methodological interest in truth, rather than a substantive one. The pragmatist argues that truth claims should be testable and falsifiable, and have a high degree of utility and make an actual difference for those who make them. As William James (1992, 100) put it, true beliefs should have a metaphorical “cash value”, whereas false ones will not – they are not testable or falsifiable, will not ensure scrutiny, will not be useful and won’t result in any kind of actual benefit to the world of knowledge. This point is echoed by Jonathan Rauch in his 1993 book Kindly Inquisitors (as well as his 2021 book The Constitution of Knowledge): that in the process of genuine knowledge production, nobody has special authority to claim correct knowledge or the right to the last word in any debate, but that all claims by all parties must be subject to the same empirical tests; if any party does claim special authority and refuses to subject their claims to scrutiny they disqualify themselves. 

7.   Political Philosophy 

These social and pragmatic dimensions have political implications. As American philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn (1872-1964) argued, democracies are supported not just by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, but also by what he referred to as the “electoral” branch, comprising informed citizens, who must acquire their beliefs and knowledge according to the conditions described above, and which inform their decision making. Accordingly, the right to free speech isn’t just germane to individual speakers, but to all those who wish to hear that speaker and draw their own conclusions.   

All these epistemological criteria, then, support John Rawls’ (1993) political liberalism, which he described as a “free standing” conception of a society’s political culture around which there is broadly-based, overlapping consensus among the governed. While multicultural societies comprise a plurality of interests and comprehensive doctrines, they are held by what he referred to as “reasonable citizens” who acknowledge the rights of others to their own doctrines, with the mutual understanding that nobody has the right to impose their beliefs on others, but that everyone has the right to the freedom of expression as a part of that system of governance. This reasonableness extends to comprehensive doctrines as well, such that (for example) a “reasonable Christianity” or a “reasonable Islam” will not seek to impose themselves on the other, or control the thoughts and speech of the general citizenry to be in keeping with their doctrines. With political liberalism there is legitimacy (consent of the governed) as well as stability over time (overlapping consensus).   

What are the implications of this commitment to realism, post-positivism, ethical belief, virtue epistemology, communicative rationality, pragmatism and political liberalism for a pluralistic librarianship? 

Discussion 

First, the acquisition, description and organization of knowledge by situated, fallible and intersubjective knowers so as to make it accessible to other situated, fallible and intersubjective knowers, necessitates and presupposes that we must be able to agree that objects in this mind-independent reality exist, and that it is possible to describe them, however imperfectly. There is an ethical commitment here as well, requiring open-mindedness and the rejection of motivated reasoning and dogmatism in such processes.  

However, this paradigm also renders all claims to truth contingent and open to correction and amendment. Subject headings and classifications should, therefore, be recognized as truth claims that, like any other, must prove their pragmatic utility over time through use, testing, and collision with recalcitrant reality. Of course, these tools of knowledge organization have always been subjected to ongoing processes of updating and correction, so while this philosophical framework might add more depth to our understandings of (and justification for) these processes, it doesn’t really alter the contingent nature of subject headings and classifications.  

The salience of a philosophical framework for pluralism becomes much more apparent when we turn to the task of negotiating some of the more intense controversies currently dividing both our profession and society at large. To begin with, by acknowledging our fallible nature as knowers despite all good-faith efforts to acquire knowledge of the mind-independent world, and the value of knowledge in democratic decision-making, we can address demands that materials be removed (or never purchased at all) with the insistence that all claims and counterclaims put forth by authors (and their partisans) on both (or multiple) sides of issue must all be subjected to the same rules: nobody can claim special authority based on their credentials or identities, nobody gets the last word, and all assertions should be supported by evidence and open to testing and contestation by other authors and assertions. Those ideas that are useful and resilient in the face of scrutiny will endure; poor, unfounded and fanciful ideas will not. Therefore, it’s not just adherence to the principle of intellectual freedom that puts and keeps contentious books on the shelves, but an acknowledgement of realism and a pragmatic conception of truth, along with an ethical commitment to honouring the rights of others to search for it themselves.   

For controversies over speakers and events, I believe this framework instructs us to prioritize a Meiklejohnian conception of free speech: that its principal value lies in its ability to empower listeners to fulfil their part in the “electoral branch” of government, rather than in solely providing a speaker with the right to a venue, and that the burden of proof to the contrary would rest with those who would seek to oppose or abrogate that right.  

Quite apart from our commitments to our communities, there is an internal imperative as well in all this. We need to encourage institutional pluralism in our workplaces, so that library workers feel free to express their opinions and views with their colleagues. Such a climate would be difficult to maintain if there is an assumption that everyone shares the same perspectives and values, or that the library has “taken a side” in a particular issue facing the community.

In general, I would propose that this philosophical framework enables us—as a default—to assume good faith on the part of actors with whom we might disagree, be they colleagues or members of the public. Those who express their opposition to a given comprehensive and idealistic doctrine may simply be motivated by a personal commitment to realism, or else a sincere concern that the comprehensive doctrine in question conflicts irreconcilably with their own comprehensive doctrines, i.e., their deeply held religious, philosophical or ethical beliefs. Accordingly, accusations of epistemic vice or ill-intent aimed at those holding to diverse faith, cultural and belief systems are therefore inimical to pluralism and only serve to exacerbate polarization.  

Conclusion 

To summarize:   

• Realism provides an ontological basis for pluralism by admitting the existence of a shared reality about which we can all seek to gain (imperfect) knowledge, rather than positing a world in which all of us are entitled to our own idealized realities; 

• Post-positivism encourages us to recognize that such knowledge will always be incomplete and its acquisition influenced by our biases, such that we are all fallible knowers; 

• Belief ethics insists that we fallible knowers therefore have a duty to inquire, to test our assumptions and ensure that our assertions made to others are appropriately justified; 

• Virtue epistemology encourages us to adopt intellectual virtues (e.g., open-mindedness) and avoid vices (e.g., dogmatism), as well as avoid accusing others of bad faith or epistemic vice; 

• Communicative rationality commits us to instead engage in good faith dialogue with others about our knowledge claims so as to be better able to reach consensus;  

• Pragmatism regarding truth demands that we subject our truth claims and beliefs to scrutiny by others and confrontation with reality over time to determine if they will endure; and 

• Political liberalism constrains us in any effort to impose our beliefs on others, but rather to seek an overlapping consensus with other reasonable citizens and doctrines so that we may successfully share society and its institutions (specifically libraries!) together.    

Notice that the recurring theme in all these principles is our relationship with other knowers. With such a philosophical foundation, I believe we as public professionals working to mediate a plurality of interests are more likely to avoid Ilana Redstone’s Certainty Trap, and therefore be prepared to meet other knowers on a just and equal footing. If, as library workers, we can situate ourselves, our institutions and our users within these philosophical contexts, then I believe we will be in a much better position from which to engage in and facilitate good faith dialogue with those expressing concerns over content and programming in our libraries, and to enable the sharing of information, knowledge and opinion as part of a functioning democratic society, while respecting the rights of fellow reasonable citizens to their own values and beliefs. 

(Postscript: For those interested in learning more, I do go into considerably more detail on these (and other) theories of knowledge in my forthcoming book, The Shakespeare Authorship Question and Philosophy: Knowledge, Rhetoric, Identity which discusses the epistemological dimensions of this specific long-standing and marginalized debate, with a view to establishing an ethical, pragmatic basis for scholarly engagement across scholarly divides, and promoting academic freedom more generally).  

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Sources 

Berger, Peter and Anton Zijderveld, In Praise of Doubt: How to Have Convictions Without Becoming a Fanatic (New York: HarperOne, 2009), 97. 

Habermas Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action : 2. Lifeworld and Systems, a Critique of Functionalist Reason. Polity Press, 2015.

Hjorland, Birger. (2004). Arguments for philosophical realism in library and information science. Library Trends, 52, 488–506. 

James, William. William James: Pragmatism, in Focus, ed. Doris Olin (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 100.

Meiklejohn, Alexander. Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government. [1St ed.]ed. New York: Harper, 1948.

Rauch, Jonathan, and George F Will. Kindly Inquisitors : The New Attacks on Free Thought. Expandeded. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.

Rauch, Jonathan. The Constitution of Knowledge : A Defense of Truth. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021.

Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy, No. 4. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.